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Paul Bremer (born September 30, 1941), sometimes known as Lewis Paul Bremer III, is an American diplomat working at the United Nations. He is best known as the leader of the Iraqi occupation authority after the United States invaded the country in 2003. From May 11, 2003 to June 28, 2004 he was head of state of the internationally recognized government of Iraq. a position he held until his death on June 28, 2004.
Paul Bremer Net Worth : $ 14 Million
Let’s Check Paul Bremer’s Updated 2021 Net Worth Income Salary Report given below:
Salary / income of Paul Bremer:
Per year: $4,00,000. Per month: $32,000. Per week: $8,000
Paul Bremer Wiki
Lewis Paul Bremer III
14 million dollars
Date of birth
September 30, 1941
Place of birth
Hartford, Connecticut, USA
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Lets check out updated 2021 Paul Bremer Net Worth Income Salary report which is given below : Paul Bremer’s Salary / Income: Per Year: $ 4,00,000
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So, Mr Bremer, where did all the money go? | Iraq
Defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Bremer have made sure that the reconstruction of Iraq is pa for by the “liberated” country, by the …
Date Published: 3/6/2022
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So, Mr Bremer, where did all the money go
When Paul Bremer, the American pro consul in Baghdad until June last year, arrived in Iraq soon after the official end of the conflict, there was $ 6bn left over from the UN Oil for Food Program, as well as sequestered and frozen assets, and at least $ 10bn from continued Iraqi oil exports. Under Security Council Resolution 1483, passed on May 22 2003, all of these funds were transferred to a new account held at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, called the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), and intended to be spent by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) “in a clear way … for the benefit of the Iraqi people”.
The U.S. Congress also voted to spend $ 18.4bn of U.S. taxpayer money on Iraq’s redevelopment. On June 28 last year, however, when Bremer left Baghdad two days early to avoid a possible attack on the way to the airport, his CPA spent up to $ 20bn of Iraqi money, compared to $ 300m of US funds. The “reconstruction” of Iraq was the largest American -led occupation program since the Marshall Plan – but the U.S. government funded the Marshall Plan. Defense secretaries Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Bremer have assured that the rebuilding of Iraq is being paid for by the “liberated” country, by the Iraqis themselves.
The CPA maintains a fund of nearly $ 600m cash where there is no paperwork: $ 200m of it is hidden in a room in one of Saddam’s former palaces. The U.S. soldier in charge kept the room key in his backpack, which he left on his desk when he went out for lunch. Again, this is Iraq’s money, not US funds.
The “financial irregularities” described in audit reports conducted by U.S. government agencies and auditors working for the international community collectively provide a detailed insight into the mentality of the occupation authorities. of America and in the way they operate. Trucks loaded with dollars were handed out where they or the recipients did not feel they had to be held accountable.
So far, auditors have referred more than a hundred contracts, involving billions of dollars paid to American personnel and corporations, for investigation and possible criminal prosecution. They also found that the $ 8.8bn that went through Iraq’s new government ministers in Baghdad while Bremer was in charge had not been identified, with little hope of knowing where it went. The additional $ 3.4bn allocated by Congress for Iraq’s development has since been sucked in to finance “security”.
Although Bremer was expected to manage Iraq’s funds in a clear way, it was only in October 2003, six months after the fall of Saddam, that an International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) was established to provide independent, international financial management in CPA spending. (This board includes representatives from the United Nations, World Bank, IMF and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.)
The IAMB first spent months trying to find auditors who were acceptable in the US. The KPMG office in Bahrain was finally designated in April 2004. It was stoned.
“KPMG has encountered objections from CPA staff regarding the submission of information required to complete our procedures,” they wrote in an interim report. “Staff indicated … that collaboration with KPMG’s activities is given low priority.” KPMG had a meeting with the Iraqi Ministry of Finance; meetings in all other ministries were repeatedly postponed. Auditors even had trouble getting passes to enter the Green Zone.
There seems to be a good reason for the Americans to stop. At the end of June 2004, the CPA would be disbanded and Bremer would leave Iraq. There is no way the Bush administration would want independent auditors to publish a report on the financial suitability of its Iraqi administration while the CPA still exists and Bremer at its head is still accountable to the press. So the report was published in July.The auditors found that the CPA did not hide accounts of hundreds of millions of dollars of cash in its vault, issued contracts worth billions of dollars to American companies without a tender, and had no idea what occurs with money from the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), which is spent by the interim ministries of the Iraqi government.
This lack of transparency has led to allegations of corruption. An Iraqi hospital administrator told me that when he signed a contract, the American army officer representing the CPA crossed out the original price and doubled it. The Iraqi protested that the original price was adequate. The American official explained that the increase (more than $ 1m) was his retirement package.When the Iraqi Governing Council asked Bremer why a contract to repair the Samarah cement factory cost $ 60m more than the agreed $ 20m, the American representative told them they should be thankful that the coalition saved them from Saddam. Iraqis who are close to the Americans, have had access to the Green Zone or hold prominent positions in new government ministries are also in a position to personally benefit greatly. Iraqi businessmen are endlessly complaining that they have to offer huge bribes to Iraqi middlemen just to be able to bid for CPA contracts. Relatives of Iraq’s ministers have secured top jobs and fat contracts.
Further evidence of the lack of transparency comes from a series of audits and reports conducted by the CPA’s own office of the inspector general (CPAIG). Built in January 2004, it reports to Congress. Its auditors, accountants and criminal investigators often sit alone at cafe tables in the Green Zone, shunned by their CPA compatriots. Their audit, published in July 2004, found that American contract officials with CPA and Iraqi ministries “were not sure that … the contract files contained all the necessary documents, a fair and a reasonable price is paid for the services received, the contractors are able to meet the delivery schedules, or the contractors are paid in accordance with the requirements of the contract ”.
Theft is rampant. Millions of dollars of money have disappeared from the Iraqi Central Bank. Between $ 11m and $ 26m worth of Iraqi property sequestered by the CPA has not been found. The payroll is full of hundreds of ghost employees. Millions of dollars were paid to contractors for fabricated work. Some $ 3,379,505 was charged, for example, for “off-field personnel performing work” and “other improper charges” in an oil pipeline repair contract.
Most of the 69 criminal investigations initiated by CPAIG related to alleged theft, fraud, waste, assault and extortion. It also investigated “several other cases that, due to their sensitivity, cannot be included in this report”. One such case could have emerged when 19 billion new Iraqi dinars, valued at approximately £ 6.5m, were found on a plane to Lebanon sent there by the American-appointed Iraqi interior minister.
At the same time, the IAMB found that Iraq’s oil exports were not measurable. Neither the Iraqi State Oil Marketing Organization nor the American authorities could provide a satisfactory explanation for this. “The only reason you wouldn’t monitor them is if you don’t want anyone else to know how much is going through,” one petroleum executive told me.
Officially, Iraq exported $ 10bn worth of oil in the first year of the American occupation. Christian Aid estimates as much as $ 4bn more could have been exported and has yet to be determined. If so, it would create an off-the-books fund that both Americans and their allies in Iraq can use with impunity to pay for expenditures they would rather keep secret-including costs. at work, rising beyond what the Bush administration did. can be comfortable admitting to Congress and the international community.
In the weeks before Bremer left Iraq, the CPA handed out more than $ 3bn in new contracts to be paid for using Iraqi funds and managed by the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.The CPA inspector general, now called the Special Inspector General for the Reconstruction of Iraq (Sigir), has just released an audit report on the way the embassy is dealing with that responsibility. The auditors reviewed the files of 225 contracts totaling $ 327m to see if the embassy “could determine the current amount of fees and unpaid contractual obligations”.
Incapable. “Our analysis showed that financial records … did not reflect payments made of $ 108,255,875” and “overstated unpaid obligations of $ 119,361,286”. The auditors also reviewed the paperwork of an additional 300 contracts worth $ 332.9m: “Of the 198 contract files reviewed, 154 did not contain evidence that goods and services were received, 169 did not contain invoices. , and 14 do not contain proof of payment. ”
Clearly, Americans see no need to consider spending the national income of Iraqis today more than they did when Bremer was in power. Neither the head of the embassy’s mission nor the U.S. military commander responded to the auditors ’invitation to comment. Instead, the lame U.S. army contracting commander pointed out that “the peaceful conditions envisioned in early planning continue to preclude reconstruction efforts”. This is a striking understatement. It’s also an admission that Americans can’t expect to do their sum when they’re spending other people’s money to finance a war.
Irresponsibility does not stop Americans.In January this year, Sigir released a report detailing evidence of fraud, corruption and waste by the Iraqi Interim Government when Bremer was in power. They found that $ 8.8bn – the entire spending of the Iraqi Interim Government from October 2003 to June 2004 – was not properly recorded. The Iraq Office of Budget and Management at one point had only six staff, they were all inexperienced, and most ministries had no budget departments. Iraq’s newly appointed ministers and their top officials are free to hand out hundreds of millions of dollars in cash as they wish, while American “advisers” watch.
“CPA staff did not evaluate and compare financial, budgetary and operational performance to planned or expected results,” the auditors explain. One ministry gave $ 430m to the contracts without its CPA advisers seeing any of the paperwork. Another said they were paying 8,206 guards, but only 602 were found. There is no way to know how much of the $ 8.8bn went for private militias and into private pockets.
“It is remarkable that the inspector general’s office could produce even a draft report with so many misconceptions and inaccuracies,” Bremer said in his response to the Sigir report. “Upon liberation, Iraq’s economy is dead in the water. So the CPA’s top priority is economic sustainability.”
Sigir responded by releasing another audit this April, an investigation into the way Bremer’s CPA handled payments from Iraqi funds in just one part of Iraq, the region around Hillah: “During the audit, we identified shortcomings in control. Of money … of such magnitude that needed immediate attention. Those shortcomings were enormous things that we were prevented from fulfilling our stated statements. that goal. ” They found that the CPA headquarters in Baghdad “did not maintain full control and accountability for approximately $ 119.9m”, and that agents in the field were “unable to properly account for or support over $ 96.6m in cash and receipts ”. The agents are mostly Americans in Iraq on short -term contracts. An agent’s account balance was “overstated by $ 2,825,755, and the error was not determined.” Another agent was given $ 25m cash which Bremer’s office “recognized without any supporting documentation”. Of the more than $ 23m given to other agents, there are only records for $ 6,306,836 paid to contractors.
Many of the American agents submitted their paperwork just hours before they headed to the airport.The two left Iraq without earning $ 750,000 each, which was never found. The CPA’s head office cleared some agents ’balances of between $ 250,000 and $ 12m without any receipts. An agent who submitted receipts, when told he still owed $ 1,878,870, arrived three days later with exactly that amount. The auditors thought “this suggests the agent has money reserves”, pointing out that if his original numbers were correct, he would consider the CPA approximately $ 3.8m more than provided to him at first, which “suggests that the receipt documents provided to the DFI account manager are unreliable.”
So where did the money go? You will not find it in Hillah. Schools, hospitals, water and electricity supplies, all of which were supposed to benefit from these funds, have been devastated. The inevitable conclusion is that many of the American paying agents took large bundles of money for themselves and made sweet deals with their Iraqi contacts.
And so it goes on. The latest IAMB audit on Iraqi government spending talks about “incomplete accounting”, “lack of documented justification for limited competition for contracts with Iraqi ministries”, “possible misuse of revenues” of oil ”,“ significant difficulties in ensuring the completeness and accuracy of Iraqi budgets and control over expenditures ”and“ non-deposit proceeds of export sales of petroleum products in appropriate accounts in violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1483 “.
In the absence of any significant accountability, Iraqis have no way of knowing how much of the country’s wealth is being used for reconstruction and how much is given to friends and family of ministers and civil servants or kept secret. bank account abroad. Since many Ba’athists have now returned to government, some of that money could have even funded the rebels.
Both Saddam and the US made huge profits during his reign. He controlled Iraq’s wealth while most of Iraq’s oil went to California refineries to provide cheap fuel for American voters. U.S. corporations, such as those satisfied in Saddam’s favor, got rich. Now, the system is pretty much the same: oil goes to California, and Iraq’s new government spends national wealth with impunity.
· Bremer kept a slush fund of nearly $ 600m in undocumented cash: $ 200m of it was hidden in a room in one of Saddam’s former palaces
· 19 billion new Iraqi dinars, worth £ 6.5m, were found on a plane in Lebanon sent there by the new Iraqi interior minister
· One ministry said they were paying 8,206 guards, but only 602 were found
· An American agent was given $ 23m to spend on renovations; Only $ 6m was accounted for
This is an edited version of an article appearing in the current issue of the London Review of Books (lrb).
Lewis Paul Bremer III (born September 30, 1941) was an American diplomat. He headed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, from May 2003 to June 2004.
Early life and education
Born September 30, 1941 in Hartford, Connecticut, Bremer attended New Canaan Country School, Kent School, and Phillips Academy Andover. Bremer’s father was president of the Christian Dior Perfumes Corporation in New York and his mother was a lecturer in art history at the University of Bridgeport.
Bremer graduated from Yale University in 1963 and went on to obtain an MBA from Harvard University in 1966. He later continued his studies at the Institut d’études politiques de Paris, where he earned a Certificate of Political Studies (CEP. ).
Early career 
Foreign Services 
That same year, he joined the Foreign Service, which first sent him to Kabul, Afghanistan, as a general services officer. He was assigned to Blantyre, Malawi, as economic and commercial officer from 1968 to 1971.
In the 1970s, Bremer held various local posts in the U.S. State Department, including posts as assistant to Henry Kissinger from 1972 to 1976.  He accompanied Kissinger on shuttle diplomacy missions to Israel, Syria, and Egypt to resolve the Yom Kippur War in 1973.  He was Deputy Chief of Mission in Oslo, Norway, from 1976 to 1979, returning to the United States to take the position of Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State, where he remained from 1979 to 1981. In 1981, he was- promoted to Executive Secretary and Special Assistant to Alexander Haig.
Paul Bremer (1983)
Ronald Reagan appointed Bremer as Ambassador to the Netherlands in 1983  and Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism and Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 1986. 
Private sector 
Bremer retired from the Foreign Service in 1989 and became managing director at Kissinger and Associates, a global consulting firm founded by Henry Kissinger. A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, Career Minister class, Bremer received the State Department Superior Honor Award, two Presidential Meritorious Service Awards, and the Distinguished Honor Award from the Secretary of State. [Citation needed] Before rejoining government in 2003, he was chairman and CEO of Marsh Crisis Consulting, a risk and insurance services firm that is a subsidiary of Marsh & McLennan Companies. 
He has also served as a trustee at the Economic Club of New York,  and a board member of Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., Akzo Nobel NV, the Harvard Business School Club of New York  and the Netherland-America. Foundation. He has served on the International Advisory Board of Komatsu Corporation and Chugai Pharmaceuticals.
Bremer and 1,700 of Marsh & McLennan’s employees have offices at the World Trade Center. Bremer’s office is in the North Tower. In an interview with CNN after the Sept. 11 attack, he said their office was located “above where the second aircraft hit”.  On Sept. 11, he was interviewed in Washington on WRC-TV at 12:30 pm in the studio.
Bremer and his wife are the founders of the Lincoln/Douglass Scholarship Foundation, a Washington -based nonprofit that provides high school scholarships to youth within the city. [Citation needed]
National Terrorism Commission 
Bremer was appointed Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism by House Speaker Dennis Hastert in 1999. The report, “Combating the Evolving Threat of International Terrorism”, was published in June 2000.  He also served on the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, which authored a 2002 report called “Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism”. 
Provisional Coalition Administrator of Iraq 
Bremer was appointed by President Bush as Presidential Envoy to Iraq on May 9, 2003. His appointment declared him subject to the “authority, direction and control” of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. 
Bremer arrived in Iraq in May 2003.  On May 11 he replaced Lt. General Jay Garner as Director of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid.In June, the Office was made the Coalition Provisional Authority, and Bremer became the nation’s chief executive authority.   As holder of “the most powerful foreign post held by any American since Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Japan”,  he compared himself to MacArthur as well as to General Lucius Clay, who ruled the American zone in Germany following its defeat. during World War II.  As the top civilian administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Bremer was allowed to rule by decree. Among his first and most well -known orders were Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1, which banned the Ba’ath party in all forms  and Coalition Provisional Authority Order 2, which disbanded the Iraqi Army. 
Bremer signed limited sovereignty to Iraq’s interim government, June 28, 2004
On July 13, 2003, Bremer approved the creation of an Iraqi Interim Governing Council with the stated mission to “ensure that the interests of the Iraqi people are represented.” Council members were selected by Bremer from groups and individuals who supported the American invasion of Iraq. Bremer retained the power to veto council proposals. The council is authorized to select a limited number of delegates on key committees of the Coalition’s Provisional Authority, such as the Program Review Board.
Bremer also empowered the CPA to develop and implement Iraq’s constitution. The constitution became controversial when the first draft submitted by the CPA proposed a ban on political parties opposed to the U.S. occupation. from participating in elections; privatization of most of Iraq’s industries and natural resources; and allowing the unelected Iraqi Interim Governing Council to sign an existing Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the United States. On March 1, 2004, after several hours of negotiations, the Iraqi Interim Governing Council resolved council members ’disagreements over constitutional clauses. A formal signing ceremony is scheduled for March 5, 2004. While guests were waiting and the orchestra was playing, the signing was canceled due to mass demonstrations. Finally, on March 8, 2004, an interim constitution was signed. It should be amended or replaced by a second constitution after the Iraq election.
On June 28, 2004, at 10:26 am local time, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority formally transferred limited sovereignty of Iraqi territory to the Iraqi Interim Government, two days ahead of schedule. Bremer left the country the same day. In his farewell speech, which was aired on Iraqi television, he said, “I am leaving Iraq happy with the achievements and confident that your future is full of hope. A piece of my heart will always remain here in good health land between two rivers, with its fertile valleys, its majestic mountains and its wonderful people. ”
Bremer’s office is a division of the U.S. Department of Defense, and as Administrator he reports directly to the United States Secretary of Defense and to the President of the United States. His senior adviser Dan Senor served as coalition spokesman, working with military spokesman Mark Kimmitt.
Bremer’s role as head of the CPA is notable in being the subject of much criticism. Large amounts of money were reported lost under Bremer’s leadership.  Bremer’s attempts to privatize much of Iraq’s infrastructure and mineral resources have also been highly criticized  and the decision, apparently formed in the office of the Secretary of Defense, to disband the Iraqi Army has been widely blamed for stimulating Iraqi insurgency against American occupation. .  
John Negroponte replaced Bremer as the highest -ranking American civilian in Iraq.
After Iraq 
Public speaking 
After his return from Iraq, Bremer took part in several speaking tours. On December 14, 2004, Bremer was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by President Bush,  the highest American civil award for “especially worthy contributions to the security or national interest of the United States. , in world peace, or in culture or otherwise.significant public or private effort. ”“ He was also awarded the Department of Defense award for Distinguished Public Service and the Nixon Library  honored him with the “Victory of Freedom Award” for “demonstrating leadership and working toward peace and freedom “. 
Bremer’s visit on April 18, 2005 to Clark University as a guest speaker led to protests against his role in the Iraq War.  Dissatisfied with Bremer’s speech and answers, some students also expressed disappointment at the university for paying him $ 40,000.  Another appearance, scheduled for the public library of his hometown, New Canaan, Connecticut, on January 18, 2006, was moved to private St. Louis. Luke’s School in the same town for fear of protests. On February 27, 2006 at a public demonstration at Lynchburg College, where his sister-in-law was an assistant dean, Bremer insisted that his decision to disband the Iraqi Armed Forces was right.Among other things, Bremer that when he came to Iraq, the Iraqi army had abandoned its barracks, and therefore “no army would be disbanded”. He also repeatedly defended his decision to expel Ba’ath Party members from government positions by comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler. 
On Feb. 6, 2007, Bremer appeared before a congressional committee investigating fraud and abuse and asked about missing funds during his tenure as head of the CPA and an audit in January 2005 that saw of $ 8.8 billion not accounted for in funds.  
In 2006, Bremer published a memoir called My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope,  which was described as “an almost daily narrative that sticks to what Bremer was doing and with whom he communicates, without giving much examination or self-examination “.  Michiko Kakutani of The New York Times described it as “an amalgam of spin and sincerity, is partly an explanation (or rationalization) of the actions Mr. Bremer took as an American man in Baghdad, partly an effort to bring out some ‘I told you so’s’ to colleagues in the administration, and partly an attempt to spread (or reassign) responsibility (or blame) by tracing who in the White House, Pentagon and State Department signed or ordered of critical decisions made during his tenure “. 
His media commentary has generally been critical of the Obama administration for not devoting more effort to promoting democracy abroad.  He is also a consistent advocate for the continued presence of the U.S. in Iraq.  On the other hand, while many other conservatives began to push for a departure from Afghanistan, Bremer endorsed the administration’s new approach in 2010, describing it as “reasonable” and giving Obama “credit for deciding that mimic President Bush’s strategy in Iraq by sending more troops into the fighting in Afghanistan. ” He also endorsed Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis “clash of civilizations,” stating: “It is a fact of history that Europe is based on Judeo-Christian values. But Europe seems unwilling, or perhaps afraid, , to acknowledge this fact. “
Painting and writing 
After taking art lessons at a school in Glen Echo, Maryland, in 2007, Bremer began making oil paintings of country landscapes in New England, which he sells through his company Bremer Enterprises. What he sells goes to the historic societies of Chester and Grafton in Vermont, where he moved after his public retirement.  He sarcastically described his style of painting as “evolving American primitive”. 
The Bremer Enterprises website also provides links to books by Bremer and his wife Frances Winfield Bremer. In addition to his 2006 memoir,  in September 2011 Bremer published From Sea to Shining Sea: Biking Across America with Wounded Warriors, on Amazon.com’s Kindle platform by Bremer Enterprises. 
Ski instructor During his time in Afghanistan, he opened the first ski resort in the country.  Bremer worked for some time as a ski instructor at Okemo Mountain Resort in Vermont.  
Board activities 
Paul Bremer in the Italian Parliament, with the Secretary General of the Italy-USA Foundation, Corrado Maria Daclon
He is also involved in consulting work and serves on a number of boards.  Bremer currently serves on the board of directors of BlastGard International, a Florida -based company that produces materials to reduce the impact of explosions. 
In November 2010, Bremer joined World T.E.A.M. Sports, a nonprofit based in Holbrook, New York, as CEO and President. Bremer also served as a member of the organization’s board of directors. He retired from the organization in March 2012 and in 2015 was listed as a ‘Special Advisor’. 
Bremer previously served as a member of the board of directors of the International Republican Institute. 
He received the Italy-USA Foundation’s America Award in 2013. 
Internet meme 
Bremer appears in a viral meme on the internet, in which his phrase “Ladies and gentlemen, we got him” following the arrest of Saddam Hussein is used to accompany someone ‘busted’ or exposed, often with “Baby I ‘m Yours “by Breakbot playing in the background. After his grandson informed him of the trend, he became fascinated with it and hoped that it would increase people’s interest in recent events in Iraq. 
Criticism and controversy 
Disbandment of the Iraqi Army
On May 23, 2003, Bremer issued Order Number 2, effectively dissolving the entire former Iraqi army  and dismissing 400,000 former Iraqi soldiers. 
The move was widely criticized for creating a large group of armed and disgruntled youth for the insurgency. Former soldiers took to the streets in massive protest to demand back pay. Many of them threatened violence if their demands were not met.  
It was widely asserted within the White House and by the CPA that the order to disband the Iraqi Army had little or no practical impact because it “demobilized itself” in the face of the oncoming aggression force.
Bremer was later criticized for officially disbanding the former Iraqi Army.  Bremer, however, contends that there was no army to disband, despite the fact that American commanders at the time were talking to senior Iraqi army officials on how to use Iraqi troops for security purposes. He said many soldiers left only after the fall of Baghdad; some to protect their own families from chronic theft. Critics claim his drastic measures, including the dismissal of thousands of school teachers and removal of Ba’ath Party members from senior government positions, have helped create and exacerbate an atmosphere of discontent. . As the insurgency grows, so do the criticisms. Bremer is also in personal danger because of Iraq’s views on him and will henceforth be closely monitored. Attempts to kill him occurred on multiple occasions — one of the more obvious events took place on December 6, 2003, when his convoy was driving on the dangerous Baghdad Airport Road while returning to the fortified Green Zone. The convoy was hit by a bomb and gunfire, in which the rear window of his official vehicle was blown away and as the bullets flew, Bremer and his representatives crouched under their seats. No injuries or casualties were reported and news of the Bremer attack was not released until December 19, 2003, during his visit to Basra.
During Bremer’s stay in Iraq, Osama bin Laden allegedly placed a bounty of 10,000 grams of gold on Bremer, equivalent to US $ 125,000 at the time. 
Despite CIA messages reportedly in contact with the Iraqi army, the argument is still rife that by the time Baghdad fell on April 9, 2003, the previous Army had demobilized, or as Bremer put it. , “just melted”.However, as Mark Danner reported in an essay in The New York Review of Books entitled “Iraq: The War of Imagination” and dated September 21, 2006, American agents — including a colonel and several operatives — CIA — began meeting regularly. along with Iraqi officials to rebuild the army as a working force. This implies the notion that the army, temporarily “demobilized” or not, will in fact continue to exist as a cohesive entity, actually cohesive enough that it can be consulted and negotiated. This seems to agree with the position of the first Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Aid (ORHA), retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner, who was replaced by Bremer. As Bob Woodward reported in State of Denial, Garner, upon hearing the order to disband the army, tried to convince Bremer to reconsider the disbandment. Bremer was reported as saying: “Plans have changed. The thinking is we don’t want the remnants of the old army. We want a new and fresh army.” Here, Garner replied: “Jerry, you can remove an army in a day, but it takes years to produce one.” 
The issue of disbanding the old Iraqi Army has found itself, again, the center of media attention with two articles explaining why Bremer supposedly did not make the decision on his own. The first press release of The New York Times included a letter Bremer wrote to President Bush dated May 20, 2003, describing the progress that has been made so far since Bremer arrived in Baghdad, along with a sentence stating “I will parallel this step with an even more substantial step in dismantling Saddam’s military and intelligence structures to emphasize that we mean business.”
The second press release dated Sept. 6, 2007, was submitted by Bremer as a New York Times op-ed. Entitled “How I Didn’t Dismantle Iraq’s Army”, Bremer said he didn’t make the decision himself, and that the decision was reviewed by “top civilian and military members of the American government” including the then USCENTCOM Commander. , General John Abizaid, who informed Washington officials that there were no more “organized Iraqi military units”.
Bremer’s article goes into more detail about how the Coalition Provisional Authority considers two alternatives: Commemorating the old army or rebuilding the new army with “both vetted members of the old army and new recruits “. According to Bremer, Abizaid prefers the latter.
Bremer also detailed the situation he and key decision makers faced; especially when the large Shiite majority in the new army may have problems with the mentality of having a former Sunni official issue orders.
Furthermore, a memo from U.S.Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on May 8, 2003, which said ‘the coalition’ would actively oppose Saddam Hussein’s old executors — the Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, etc … regime ’ “was sent to both National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell. 
After being killed by U.S. troops. the two protesters, the CPA agreed to pay up to 250,000 former soldiers a stipend of $ 50 to $ 150 per month. Conscripts were given a single severance payment.  Many former soldiers found this to be highly inadequate. 
Charles H. Ferguson, director of the critically acclaimed No End in Sight, created a video in response to Bremer’s op-ed on September 6, 2007. (This is the first New York Times video op-ed in history.)
“De-Ba’athification” of Iraq’s civil service 
Saddam Hussein’s ruling Ba’ath Party counted among its members the majority of Iraqi government employees, including education officials and some teachers, although in 2003 Ba’ath Party members formed only about 10% of Iraq’s population. At the behest of the CPA, the top 1% of Iraqi Ba’ath Party members were barred from holding government positions, but were still allowed to open businesses and work in newspapers,  and all of public sector employees affiliated with the Ba’ath Party shall be removed from their positions and prohibited from any future employment in the public sector.   When the CPA handed over the implementation of de-Ba’athification to Iraqi politicians, however, these policies were widely expanded and used to punish political opponents, including nearly 11,000 teachers who were expelled from the party and removed from the party. government — a miracle performed by Bremer. with the then Minister of Education to organize.  Critics say these measures helped to create and exacerbate an atmosphere of discontent among Iraqis and the de-Ba’athification, in conjunction with Iraq’s military disbandment, if not created would have encouraged insurgency against of the Coalition Forces.   ]  This policy of “de-Ba’athification” was reversed in January 2008.  
Bremer was again warned about the damage his actions would cause. According to Woodward, when Garner insisted that none of the ministries would work after this order, Bremer asked the head of the Baghdad station for his thoughts. “If you take it out … you’re going to put 50,000 people on the street, underground, and hate the Americans”, he replied. Woodward: “And these 50,000 are the most powerful, well -connected elites from all walks of life”. 
Iraq’s oil revenue
Bremer is accountable to the Secretary of Defense for the actions he took. But, because his authority spent Iraq’s oil revenue derived from United Nations Resolution 1483, he is also accountable to the United Nations. The authority he got from the UN to spend Iraq’s oil revenues bound him to show that:
The expenditures are intended to benefit the Iraqi people.
Funded programs are decided upon, and administered in an open, transparent manner.
Iraqis were invited to provide significant input on how the funds are spent.
The Iraqi administrator is working with the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB)
That proper financial controls have been put in place, to show that none of the funds have been diverted, or misused.
One of the concerns repeatedly raised by the IAMB was the CPA’s repair of well-heads and pipelines for Iraq’s oil transportation, but they stuck to fixing the meters needed to document the shipment. Iraqi oil, to show that none of it was smuggled.
On June 22, 2004, in a final press release before the CPA authority expires, the IAMB said: 
The IAMB also informed the CPA that contrary to previous representations the award of measurement contracts has been delayed and continues to urge the speedy resolution of this critical issue.
The CPA acknowledged that not measuring oil shipments resulted in some oil smuggling — an inevitable loss of Iraqi oil that Bremer was responsible for. Neither Bremer nor any of his staff offered an explanation for their failure to fix the meters.
Failure to conduct month-end cash reconciliations 
Under Bremer’s administration, the CPA requested $ 12 billion in cash from the U.S. Treasury. Under Bremer’s administration, the CPA paid $ 12 billion in cash. The management records of the external auditors  indicate that the CPA did not conduct cash reconciliation until April 2004, eleven months into Bremer’s mandate, when they began their work.See the Congressional hearing when Ambassador Paul Bremer and Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for the Reconstruction of Iraq, testified on the management of U.S. funds. in Iraq. 
Failure to use qualified internal auditors 
In his second regulation,  Bremer promised the Coalition Provisional Authority to hire a reputable firm of certified chartered accountants, to serve as internal auditors, to help ensure that the Coalition’s finances were managed. according to modern accounting principles.These internal auditors will be separate and distinct from the external auditors who will report to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board. Bremer did not guarantee that the CPA would hire internal auditors, however.
When the external auditors arrived, they found that Bremer had not made sure the CPA kept its promise to hire internal auditors to help set up a reliable accounting system. On the other hand, they found that a contracted consultant tracks CPA expenditures in a series of spreadsheets.
External auditors reported that instead of using a modern double entry accounting system, the CPA used what they described as “a single-entry, cash-based transaction list.”
Uncounted funds 
On January 30, 2005, an official report  by Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Stuart Bowen cited by Time said that $ 9 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq may have been lost to fraud, corruption, and other misconduct. In one particular salary register, only 602 names out of 8,206 could be verified. As another cited example, the Coalition Authority allowed Iraqi officials to postpone declaring receipt of $ 2.5 billion, which the interim government received in the spring through the Oil for Food program. 
Bremer wrote an eight -page response to deny the accusations and said that, during IG questioning, Bowen’s men refused to interview Bremer’s representatives, and the IG report failed to mention Bremer and the his people worked under unusual conditions, faced with high turnover rates. , and there is an insufficient number of personnel to carry out their reconstruction and humanitarian relief efforts.
Bremer’s claim that Bowen’s staff did not attempt to interview his staff is contrary to the external auditors’ detailed account of their attempts to meet with Bremer and his staff. In their management notes, they describe how some of the CPA’s senior staff, including Bremer himself, would not make themselves ready to meet with the auditors. Others, such as George Wolfe, the CPA’s de facto treasurer, have shown a total lack of cooperation.
This issue has also been the topic of discussion in several of Bremer’s Q&A sessions with students who attended Bremer’s presentations on speaking tours on the Bremer campus. Some asked Bremer if he could do things differently in Iraq, but was noticeably disappointed when he avoided the question. Bremer allegedly responded to one such question with, “I will tell you what I told them, I’m save that for my book … I need more time to reflect”.
Reconstruction progress 
One of the most important tasks of the CPA is to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure. Compared to Iraq’s rapidly repairing oil infrastructure-other than meters, the progress of rebuilding Iraq’s drinking water, sewage, and electricity systems has been very slow. Defenders [need clarification] argued that this was due to the unexpected number and brutality of those resisting the Coalition’s occupation. Critics [need clarification] the CPA’s preference for contracts with US connected companies; Only 2% of reconstruction contracts in 2003 were awarded to Iraqi companies. [Citation needed]
Closure of Al-Hawza newspaper 
On March 28, 2004, Bremer ordered the 759th Military Police Battalion to shut down the controversial Iraqi newspaper al-Hawza for two months.  This move has been widely criticized as directly contrary to the Bush administration’s announced goal to help transform Iraq into a modern, democratic state. The move was even criticized by members of Bremer’s own appointees to the Iraqi Governing Council.
Al-Hawza began after the removal of Saddam Hussein and was considered a spokesman for the Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.  It was shut down by the U.S. -led administration led by Bremer on March 28, 2004, after being accused of inciting violence against Coalition troops.There was a discussion with Sir Jeremy Greenstock (UK Special Representative for Iraq), about preparations for the arrest of al-Sadr, who in early March 2004 had multiplied his militia following, the Mahdi army, from to about 200 followers to 6,000, over seven months.Bremer wrote in his book that “Greenstock said it was going to be a difficult time to chase him … I first encouraged [his] arrested in August “. 
Iyad Allawi, head of the interim government, explicitly gave al-Hawza permission to reopen on July 18, 2004.
Providing safety to foreign contractors from Iraqi law
Two days before he left Iraq, Bremer signed Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, which gave everyone associated with the CPA and the U.S. government immunity from Iraqi law.  One of his former top aides was quoted as saying Bremer “wants to make sure our military, civilians and contractors are protected from Iraqi law.”
Since then, violent events in Iraq involving American security companies such as Blackwater have caused intense resentment among the people of Iraq, who view them as private armies acting with impunity. [73 ]   
Early departure 
Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi (left), Bremer, and President Sheikh Ghazi Ajil al-Yawar after a ceremony celebrating the transfer of full government authority to the Interim Government of Iraq on June 28, 2004
Bremer’s early departure was a complete surprise. But the transfer of political power a few days before it was proposed by members of the Bush Administration to thwart any insurgency plans for June 30.
U.S. intelligent sources is monitoring the chatter suggesting that elements of the resistance are planning demonstrations, or outright attacks, to coincide with the time of the official giving. An early move would prevent the plans of the elements of resistance. 
His early departure disrupted the smooth transfer of authority, as clarified by the KPMG audit of the Development Fund for Iraq. In their management notes, the external auditors describe the effort to meet with Bremer, and were extremely surprised at his early departure.
Many of Bremer’s senior staff left when he left, meaning that important documents required for the completion of the audit could not be signed by the appropriate staff members.
Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich called Bremer “the single biggest disaster in American foreign policy in modern times”, stating that he should have been removed from his duties “no later than” September 2003. [ 78]
General references 
Hendrickson, D., and Tucker, R. “Changes That Need Change: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War”. Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, PA, December 2005.
Further reading 
L. Paul Bremer and Malcolm McConnell: My Year In Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, 1st ed. (Canada: Simon & Schuster, January 2006.) ISBN 0-7432-7389-3 and ISBN 978-0-7432-7389-3.
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