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$800,000
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The name is the same (1952-1955)
as a producer
Clayton Industries Peter Arnell, Country Manager for Italy
For exclusive use by W. Pei, 2017.
4199 MAY 18, 2010
CHRISTOPHER A. BARTLETT BENJAMIN H. BARLOW
Clayton Industries: Peter Arnell, Country Manager Italy At the end of September 2009, Peter Arnell, Country Manager of Clayton SpA, the Italian subsidiary of US-based Clayton Industries, faced some daunting challenges as the global recession took its toll. Revenue fell 19%, and after decades of solid returns, Clayton SpA was in its third year of losses, now totaling more than $1 million a month. Arnell’s attention was drawn by the upcoming visit of Dan Briggs, Clayton’s recently appointed CEO, and Simonne Buis, Arnell’s immediate boss and President of Clayton Europe. Both expected him to restructure and position Clayton SpA for future growth. And although he had only been in Italy for a little over two months, Arnell knew that Briggs and Buis wanted to know exactly what he was up to.
The Parent Company: Clayton Industries Clayton Industries Inc. was founded in Milwaukee in 1938 and had built a successful window-mounted room air conditioner business, which it sold to residential and light commercial applications. In the early 1980’s, management recognized two important growth opportunities – one in the North American commercial sector and the other in the residential and commercial markets of Europe – and took steps to capitalize on both. As Clayton expanded overseas, it consolidated its position in Europe through the acquisition of four companies: •
Corliss, a UK based manufacturer of domestic heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems.
•
Fontaire, a Brussels-based manufacturer of fans and ventilation equipment.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ HBS Professor Christopher A. Bartlett and author Benjamin H. Barlow prepared this case solely as a basis for classroom discussion and not as an endorsement, source of primary data, or illustration of effective or ineffective management. The authors thank Sisto Merolla (HBS MBA 2002) of Merloni Termosanitari Spa in Fabriano, Italy for his helpful contributions in the development of this case. Although this case is based on real events, it is fictional and any resemblance to any actual person or entity is coincidental. There are occasional references to actual corporations in the narrative. Copyright © 2010 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or to request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write to Harvard Business Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard. edu. This publication may not be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, mailed, or transmitted without permission from Harvard Business School.
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•
Control del Clima, a Barcelona-based manufacturer of air conditioning products for industrial and commercial applications.
•
AeroPuro, a Brescia, Italy based manufacturer of compression chillers for large commercial, public and institutional installations. (Chillers are the units that form the core of most industrial air conditioning systems.)
To manage international expansion, Clayton restructured its organization in 1988. All operations in the United States and Canada were reported to Clayton North America, while European acquisitions were reported to a newly created Clayton Europe. Each of these units was headed by a regional company president. (See Appendix 1 for the organizational chart.)
Clayton Europe In 1989 Clayton Europe took over the Brussels offices formerly occupied by Fontaire as its headquarters. Clayton Europe’s new President recognized the need for strong management in each country where it had a presence and appointed four country managers. They have been given responsibility for sales of the entire Clayton product line in their home country and their assigned export markets in Europe. Early progress was slow. While the European air conditioning market started to grow in the 1990s, it started from a low base. Even in 1998, only 7% of homes in Italy and 11% in Spain had air conditioning, compared to a US penetration of 71%. Air conditioning was seen by many Europeans as an expensive American luxury that was bad for the environment. Clayton’s slow market penetration also reflected the different needs and national branding preferences of Europeans. For example, Clayton’s window units (assembled in Belgium from components shipped from the United States) did not sell as well as well-known local brands, which Europeans seemed to prefer. And its central AC units also struggled in Europe, where few buildings had the duct work required for such systems. However, some Asian manufacturers had managed to gain a foothold in Europe, mainly based on price. Due to the strong national branding preferences of Europeans, the Corliss HVAC systems and Fontaire range of fans sold much better in their home markets than elsewhere in Europe. But no product represented this geographic concentration more strongly than the Italian-built Chiller line. A decade after it had been offered to all of Clayton’s European companies, sales outside of Italy accounted for just 12% of the total. In 2001 Simonne Buis, previously the driving force behind the Belgian company, was appointed President of Clayton Europe. Determined to create a more integrated European organization, their first priority was to increase the operational efficiencies of Clayton’s diverse portfolio of inherited assets. They set tough goals that required them to cut costs, build size, or both. To encourage pan-European penetration of the entire product line, she then informed the country managers that in addition to their national sales responsibilities, they would now also be responsible for the pan-European profitability of the products manufactured at their plants. She encouraged them to come out of the silos of their country offices and work together. The simple geographic structure evolved into a product-overlay matrix. Over the next seven years, Europe became a key growth engine for Clayton, increasing its share of the company’s global sales from 33% in 2000 to 45% in 2009. During this period Belgium/France overtook Italy as Clayton’s leading market in Europe at 38% of 2009 revenue ahead of Italy’s 30%. Spain accounted for 20% and the UK for 12%. 2
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But Europe’s growth engine faltered when the global recession of 2008-09 hit. (Exhibit 2 summarizes Clayton’s financial statements.) It was a crisis that triggered strategic adjustments and management changes in both the US and Europe.
Crisis response in the United States and Europe As the economic crisis deepened in 2009, the Clayton Industries board of directors convinced its 63-year-old longtime CEO to step down in favor of Dan Briggs, a 16-year company veteran with Buis who had been primed as a potential CEO successor . Briggs was a hard-nosed executive who was previously Clayton North America’s EVP. Upon assuming his new role in March 2009, Briggs quickly identified two priorities. In the face of a liquidity crisis, he stressed the urgency of reducing capital and bringing costs under control. But he also stressed that “there’s always great opportunity within a crisis,” urging managers to use the downturn to streamline the company’s portfolio and focus on products it needs for profitable post-recession growth could position. Discussing those priorities with Buis, Briggs told her he sees Europe as a continuing source of growth. However, he questioned whether the company should continue its attempts to break into the commercial air conditioning sector. Briggs believed it was a business where only the top three or four competitors in each market could make money, and he was skeptical that Clayton would get out of his current position. Buis argued that several record-breakingly hot summers in Europe were changing consumer attitudes and that the market was on the verge of accepting air conditioning. She felt the company should position itself for post-recession expansion. In recognition of Buis’ achievements in Europe, Briggs asked her to create a growth plan for him to discuss with him. To translate Briggs’ corporate priorities into European action, Buis met with her country managers and told them she wanted all country operations to reach a plan by 10/10/10 to cut both accounts receivable and inventory by 10 days and reduce headcount by 10 % to reduce. She also announced the “Top Four in Four” initiative and asked each manager to create plans showing how the product they were responsible for across Europe would be in the top 4 in European market share within four years .
Problems at Clayton SpA While these new goals would be difficult for all of Clayton’s European businesses, they would present a real challenge in Italy. Clayton SpA, which has lagged other countries in sales growth since 2004, even reported a 5.3% decline in sales in 2008, followed by a 19.4% decline in the first half of 2009. As a result, both accounts receivable and inventories exceeded 120 days’ sales. In addition, the downsizing was faced with strict local laws and a tense relationship between the unions. In short, it would be very difficult to achieve the 10/10/10 plan. The “Top Four in Four” requirement would also challenge the pan-European responsibility of the Italian unit for chillers. While this line accounted for 55% of Italian sales in 2009, it generated only 12% of sales in the rest of Europe. (See Appendices 3 and 4 for industry sales and forecasts). Of the seven companies in the European chiller market, Clayton was fifth with an overall market share of 7%.
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As performance slowed, Paolo Lazzaro, President of Clayton SpA since 1998, claimed that the problems were due to the commodity cycle and suggested that Clayton should “weather the storm”. Frustrated by this attitude, Buis Lazzaro resigned in June 2009. As she began to think about who might take over, her thoughts turned to Peter Arnell.
Peter Arnell Peter Arnell was the 42-year-old head of UK subsidiary Clayton Ltd. Arnell grew up in a working-class family on the outskirts of London and served in the Royal Marines for seven years, where he rose to the rank of captain, before going to business school in London. A brief stint in management consultancy left him missing the sense of impact he had experienced in the Royal Marines. So in 1998 he joined Clayton’s Birmingham office in a sales and marketing job that he thought would allow him to test himself again on the front lines. A keen weekend footballer, Arnell was a born competitor, quick with a handshake and a smile. He pushed himself hard and expected the same of others. Although very outgoing, he was outspoken in his opinions and had upset some colleagues during his time at Clayton. Quickly promoted to Marketing Manager, Arnell had expanded Clayton’s distribution network from four distributors in central England to 14 across the UK and Ireland and positioned Clayton’s product line to benefit from the UK property boom. As the head of Clayton Ltd. retired in 2002, Buis promoted Arnell to fill the position. Within weeks, Arnell made the difficult decision to close the old boiler plant at Corliss – a move in line with the cost-cutting program Buis had initiated a few months earlier. After months of work pressure and personal threats over the closure, he set about reviving the UK business by replacing lost revenue. He enlisted the help of product managers from other Clayton lines to help them better understand the UK market. Impressed by Arnell’s military discipline and penchant for bold action, Buis felt he could be the change agent Italy needed. She was also aware that he had acquired a good knowledge of Italian through years of summers in Italy with his maternal grandparents. When she asked him to consider acquiring Clayton SpA, Arnell saw it as a career-enhancing opportunity to transform a larger operation that was critical to Clayton’s European strategy.
A new store manager arrives Arnell arrived in Brescia alone on July 20, 2009, after asking his wife and two children to come over in October so he could focus on work. Buis met him and showed him around the offices and personally introduced him to the 10 senior managers of Brescia. Over lunch, she told them that the future of Clayton SpA was in her hands. Showing her commitment to empowering country managers and encouraging them to take initiative, she said she will “get out of their way” and returned to Brussels. That afternoon, Arnell called a management meeting to share his early assessment of Brescia’s dire situation and ask for their support. He stressed that this is a time for immediate action and urged everyone to postpone furlough plans until further notice. Since August was the Italian holiday month, three managers raised concerns – the plant manager, the QC manager and the company controller. Arnell asked her to meet with him individually before the end of the day. After each manager at these meetings repeatedly expressed an unwillingness to change plans, Arnell fired them on the spot.
4
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The next day, after meeting with his human resources director to identify strong successors, he announced internal replacements for all three positions. He then met individually with his top team and asked everyone to help him use his first 60 days to understand the situation and strategize for the company. He then scheduled follow-up meetings with each of them to share their perspectives on the operation and also to review their individual work plans for the next 60 days. But events at Clayton SpA didn’t wait for Arnell to complete his 60-day analysis. On his second day, he came to work to find four union officials from the Federazione dei Lavoratori della Manifatture (FILM) outside his office with a local television news crew. These officials suggested he was a hatchet sent to shut down the Brescia plant and carry out a mass layoff. Arnell assured them he had no such direction, that he was open and that all options were on the table. He told them he would keep them informed and promised to meet with union officials the following week. On August 4, Arnell met with seven FILM representatives to show them how much money the operations were losing. He explained that in the current economic environment, Clayton’s US parent company cannot subsidize these losses. (It was a presentation he had made earlier that day to the mayor of Brescia, who expressed concern about a plant closure and had arrived at his appointment with press photographers in tow.) After hours of acrimonious discussions, FILM agreed to release his Shortened shifts recommended for Brescia members. But Arnell knew the concessions were far less than it took the company to break even. The following week, Arnell made an appointment with Clayton’s bank to renegotiate the terms of the company’s line of credit. As a goodwill gesture and because he thought it would help his case, he invited a union official with political connections to accompany him and his finance manager. The three men secured the bank’s approval to defer large payments due in the coming quarter. Arnell knew that while these few changes wouldn’t make the plant profitable again, they could buy the company some time as he completes his assessment of the situation.
Assessing the Situation of Clayton SpA In the weeks that followed, in meetings with his management team, Arnell learned a great deal about the company’s current situation and the history that got it there. He learned that despite being responsible for sales of compression chillers across Europe, Lazzaro had remained focused on building political relationships in support of major projects in Italy. As a result, chillers accounted for 55% of Italy’s revenue and its strong position in the public and institutional segments secured its top 3 competitive position domestically. However, it lagged behind with commercial customers, who increasingly preferred Asian products that promised lower life cycle costs through more efficient design. He also learned that Clayton’s other product lines in Italy were struggling. Its central air conditioning was a poor match for Italian buildings, many of which lacked the ductwork necessary for an integrated system. For room air conditioners and fans, the market was divided between inexpensive foreign imports and well-known Italian brands. The Clayton and Fontaire brands, which offered neither a low price nor a well-known name, struggled in the Italian residential air conditioning market. And by focusing resources on the chiller line, the company had failed to develop the broader marketing capability needed to sell those other products. On the manufacturing side, Arnell discovered that the unionized workforce (which had tried to block Clayton’s acquisition of AeroPuro in 1985) was still enjoying very generous benefits. For many years, the plant’s high cost position was obscured by political connections that gave it insight into government contracts. Because of these relationships, Lazzaro refused to consider permanent layoffs, which in Italy are only possible for “reasonable cause” in companies with more than 15 HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL | BRIEFCASES were permitted
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Employee. He even declined to take advantage of the Cassa Ingrazione Guardagni (CIG), a temporary layoff provision that exempted workers who came to work in exchange for a significant pay cut, with the cost shared between the companies and the state would. This vulnerable cost position had put Brescia at risk in 2004 when Buis announced the second phase of its factory efficiency program. She focused on efficient sourcing and insisted that all plants become cost-effective, European-scale operations. An early focus of the program was deciding whether Brescia or Barcelona should become Clayton’s European source for commercial air conditioning chillers. In discussions with Carlos Sanchez, head of the Spanish company, Arnell learned that after much political maneuvering, Lazzaro had persuaded Buis to make Brescia the European source. Barcelona was smaller and older than the Italian factory and could only build 300–1000 kW units compared to the 500–2000 kW units that Brescia could make. Despite Barcelona’s 20% lower labor costs and more flexible workforce, Buis felt only the Italian operation had the capacity to meet European demand. She committed $18 million to modernize and expand the facility, which eventually employed 203 people. But Sanchez told Arnell that he felt Brescia’s staffing was still 20% to 30% overstated. Nonetheless, as Sanchez explained, he had kept the Barcelona plant running with the support of workers by licensing technology to manufacture specialized absorption chillers suited to Spain’s growing heating industry exports contributed $35 million to its The company’s 2008 sales, with 10% EBITDA, were already far more profitable than compression chillers ever were. Arnell also wanted to understand why Brescia’s chiller penetration was poor outside of Italy. Its European market share of 7% (well below Italy’s 21%) placed Clayton in fifth place behind its competitors with market shares of 36%, 23%, 16% and 12% respectively. He spoke to Country Manager colleagues in other major European markets, as well as several major customers, who told him the product was overpriced and lagged behind the competition even on innovative features such as variable speed technology. In addition, Clayton chillers lagged behind market-leading units in operational efficiency by 15%. Customers in some markets – notably Scandinavia and Germany – told Arnell of a trend towards ‘district energy systems’, which produce steam, hot water or chilled water at a central facility and then pipe it to buildings in the district for space heating, hot water, and air conditioning. Such systems favored absorption technology over the compression chillers manufactured by Brescia. While compression chillers still accounted for 85% of the market, environmentalists stressed that absorption chillers are less carbon intensive and use water instead of the ozone-depleting refrigerants required for compression systems. Finally, Arnell’s finance director reviewed the latest results, which show that the company is currently losing more than $1 million a month. He believed the losses were mainly due to a 27% rise in steel prices over the past two years – costs that could not be recouped due to aggressive pricing by foreign competitors. And instead of recognizing the problem, FILM, which wielded great influence during periods of high unemployment, had increased its demands.
1 While compression chillers like those manufactured in Brescia rely on electricity, absorption chillers are powered by heat, often from hot wastewater, and are increasingly solar powered.
6
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Decision options In early September, Arnell organized two internal conferences to help his senior team develop its plans for exposure to external input. At a manufacturing conference, production, design and QC managers from Brescia described their situation and tested their emerging ideas with respected colleagues from the Spanish, Belgian and UK plants. And at the marketing conference, the sales, marketing and product development managers exchanged ideas with invited colleagues from other Clayton country organizations. Not surprisingly, the Italian managers’ presentations focused on restoring Brescia’s viability and ensuring its long-term viability. Their emerging plan included programs to increase equipment efficiency, product development initiatives to revitalize the compression chiller product line, and a sales and marketing plan to expand market share outside of Italy. Early cost estimates were approximately $5 million, with most of this investment occurring in the first 12 months. Meanwhile, Arnell was in ongoing talks with Sanchez, who had raised an alternative option. He explained to Arnell that he had approached Buis on several occasions to finance a major new plant in Spain, but she had told him that she was not convinced that absorption chillers would ever be more than a niche market. She had also told them that she had put her investment on Brescia and wanted to give Italy a chance to prove themselves. “But the absorption chiller is the market of the future and we have the license for a best-in-class technology,” said Sanchez. “We are still unable to produce large chillers in Barcelona and we are limited to the site to expand the facility. Why not phase out your compression chiller and switch capacity to absorption chillers to meet the growing market? Together, we could make Clayton a dominant force in this segment.” It was an intriguing idea, but one that, despite the gradual transition process, would entail significant costs of layoffs and restructuring. Arnell estimated the investment would add up to around five years would be $15 million, with most of the costs incurred in the phase-out and restructuring phase in two to three years.A third option was proposed by Arnell’s finance director, who felt it was too early, in what was still an unstable environment He was skeptical of the government’s July budget bill, which projected the Italian economy to contract by 4.8% in 2009 before recovering to 0.7% growth in 2010. He called for strict concentration on efficiency measures to restore viability while managing the various Each explored strategic options for at least another six months or until things became clearer. As he considered these alternatives, Arnell knew that while he didn’t have all the answers, he did know that Briggs and Buis were booked into the Hotel Ambasciatori for two nights the following week. You would expect to hear his analysis, his vision for a healthy Clayton SpA, his plans for a turnaround and the results he expected to achieve.
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Ausstellung 1
8th
Clayton Industries: Betriebsorganisation, August 2009
AKTENTASCHEN | HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL
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Ausstellung 2
Clayton Industries: Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung – Zusammenfassung, 2004–2009
Millionen USD (außer wo angegeben)
2004
2005
2006
2007
Umsatz Clayton N. America (USA/Kanada/Mexiko)
565.7
577.1
590,0
598.1
557.7
216.6
63,2 %
2,0 % 61,8 %
2,2 % 60,7 %
1,4 % 59,6 %
(6,8 %) 58,0 %
(22,3 %) 54,7 %
107.5
118.6
129.7
142.3
148.7
68,0
12,0 %
10,3 % 12,7 %
9,3 % 13,3 %
9,8 % 14,2 %
4,4 % 15,5 %
(8,5 %) 17,2 %
125,0
132.5
138,0
141.8
134.3
54.1
14,0 %
6,0 % 14,2 %
4,2 % 14,2 %
2,7 % 14,1 %
(5,3 %) 14,0 %
(19,4 %) 13,7 %
% Veränderung % Beitrag
Clayton SA (Belgien/Frankreich/Niederlande) Veränderung in % Beitrag in %
Clayton SpA (Italien/Deutschland/Schweiz) Veränderung in % Beitrag in %
Clayton SA (Spanien/Portugal/Nordafrika) Veränderung in % Beitrag in %
Clayton Ltd (Großbritannien/Skandinavien)
2008
1H09
58.1
62.9
68.1
72.3
72.2
36.0
6,5 %
8,1 % 6,7 %
8,4 % 7,0 %
6,2 % 7,2 %
(0,1 %) 7,5 %
(0,3 %) 9,1 %
39.3
42.8
45.9
48.3
48.6
21.6
% Veränderung % Beitrag
4,4 %
8,9 % 4,6 %
7,2 % 4,7 %
5,2 % 4,8 %
0,6 % 5,1 %
(11,1 %) 5,5 %
Gesamt
895.7
933,8
971,7
1.002,8
961.4
396.3
4,3 %
4,1 %
3,2 %
(4,1%)
(17,6%)
% Veränderung
EBITDA Clayton N. America (USA/Kanada/Mexiko) % Marge
Clayton SA (Belgien/Frankreich/Niederlande) % Marge
Clayton SpA (Italien/Deutschland/Schweiz) % Marge
Clayton SA (Spanien/Portugal/Nordafrika) % Marge
70.7
69.2
53.1
47.8
27.9
6.5
12,5 %
12,0 %
9,0 %
8,0 %
5,0 %
3,0 %
20.2
21.3
17.5
17.1
11.1
3.1
18,8 %
18,0 %
13,5 %
12,0 %
7,5 %
4,5 %
25.1
24.5
18.1
5.2
(12.8)
(7.6)
20,1 %
18,5 %
13,1 %
3,7 %
(9,5%)
(14,1%)
10.0
10.4
8.4
6.9
6.6
3.2
17,2 %
16,5 %
12,4 %
9,5 %
9,1 %
8,9 %
Clayton Ltd (Großbritannien/Skandinavien) % Marge
Gesamtmarge in %
Nettogewinn (-verlust) Clayton N. America (USA/Kanada/Mexiko) % Marge
7.0
7.3
5.9
4.8
2.9
0.7
17,9 %
17,2 %
12,9 %
9,9 %
6,0 %
3,4 %
133,0
132.8
103.0
81.8
35.8
5.9
14,8 %
14,2 %
10,6 %
8,2 %
3,7 %
1,5 %
31.1
28.9
11.8
(6.0)
(22.3)
(17.3)
5,5 %
5,0 %
2,0 %
(1,0%)
(4,0%)
(8,0%)
Clayton SA (Belgien/Frankreich/Niederlande) % Marge
Clayton SpA (Italien/Deutschland/Schweiz) % Marge
8.9
9.5
10.1
10.2
5.9
0.7
8,3 %
8,0 %
7,8 %
7,2 %
4.0%
1,0 %
10.8
10.5
6.0
(1.1)
(11.9)
(6.7)
8,7 %
7,9 %
4,4 %
(0,8 %)
(8,8%)
(12,3%)
Clayton SA (Spanien/Portugal/Nordafrika) % Marge
4.1
4.1
3.7
1.9
0.2
0.0
7.1%
6,5 %
5,4 %
2,6 %
0,3 %
0,1 %
Clayton Ltd (Großbritannien/Skandinavien)
2.9
2.9
2.6
1.3
(0,3)
(0,9)
% Rand
7,4 %
6,8 %
5,6 %
2,7 %
(0,5%)
(4,2%)
Gesamt
57.9
55.8
34.2
6.4
(28.3)
(24.2)
% Rand
HARVARD-GESCHÄFTSSCHULE | AKTENTASCHEN
6,5 %
6,0 %
3,5 %
0,6 %
(2,9) %
(6,1) %
9
Dieses Dokument ist nur zur Verwendung durch Wenrui Pei in MGT 300 Winter 2017 autorisiert, das von Jaclyn Jensen, DePaul University, von Januar 2017 bis März 2017 unterrichtet wird.
Zur ausschließlichen Verwendung von W. Pei, 2017. 4199 | Clayton Industries: Peter Arnell, Country Manager für Italien
Ausstellung 3
Clayton Industries: Bilanz – Zusammenfassung, 2004–2009
Millionen USD Umlaufvermögen Clayton SpA Übriges Europa Nordamerika
Einrichtungen Clayton SpA Sonstiges Europa Nordamerika
Sonstige Vermögenswerte Clayton SpA Übriges Europa Nordamerika
Bilanzsumme Clayton SpA Übriges Europa Nordamerika
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
1H09
277,0 $
291,6 $
303,8 $
308,8 $
284,2 $
254,4 $
9,0 $ 60,6 $ 167,4 $
54,1 $ 66,5 $ 171,0 $
58,7 $ 71,7 $ 173,5 $
62,6 $ 75,2 $ 171,0 $
61,6 $ 72,5 $ 150,1 $
59,6 $ 71,5 $ 123,3 $
417,6 $
400,4 $
385,5 $
371,1 $
354,4 $
336,6 $
50,4 $ 139,4 $ 227,9 $
54,6 $ 129,4 $ 216,4 $
48,9 $ 124,9 $ 211,6 $
44,7 $ 118,7 $ 207,8 $
$ 40,7 $ 112,6 $ 201,1
38,0 $ 109,6 $ 189,1 $
88,0 $
118,7 $
124,1 $
141,3 $
125,2 $
140,2 $
12,3 $ 20,1 $ 55,6 $
16,8 $ 28,5 $ 73,4 $
17,6 $ 31,1 $ 75,4 $
20,0 $ 37,0 $ 84,3 $
17,5 $ 35,1 $ 72,6 $
19,1 $ 44,4 $ 76,6 $
782,7 $
810,7 $
813,4 $
821,2 $
763,8 $
731,2 $
111,6 $ 220,2 $ 450,9 $
125,5 $ 224,4 $ 460,8 $
125,2 $ 227,7 $ 460,5 $
127,2 $ 230,9 $ 463,1 $
119,7 $ 220,2 $ 423,8 $
116,7 $ 225,5 $ 389,0 $
Kurzfristige Verbindlichkeiten
204,3 $
224,3 $
238,6 $
255,3 $
251,7 $
255,4 $
Clayton SpA Übriges Europa Nordamerika
28,5 $ 46,7 $ 129,0 $
32,9 $ 51,3 $ 140,1 $
36,7 $ 54,6 $ 147,3 $
41,2 $ 58,4 $ 155,6 $
42,7 $ 57,6 $ 151,4 $
45,5 $ 58,4 $ 151,5 $
Langfristige Verbindlichkeiten Clayton SpA Übriges Europa Nordamerika
Eigenkapital Clayton SpA Übriges Europa Nordamerika
Summe Verbindlichkeiten und Eigenkapital Clayton SpA Übriges Europa Nordamerika
10
310,5 $
340,9 $
362,6 $
388,0 $
382,5 $
388,2 $
43,3 $ 71,1 $ 196,1 $
50,0 $ 81,9 $ 209,0 $
55,8 $ 91,5 $ 215,3 $
62,7 $ 102,8 $ 222,5 $
64,9 $ 106,4 $ 211,3 $
69,1 $ 113,4 $ 205,7 $
267,9 $
245,5 $
212,3 $
177,9 $
129,6 $
87,6 $
37,4 $ 61,3 $ 169,2 $
32,2 $ 61,5 $ 151,8 $
23,1 $ 57,9 $ 131,3 $
12,2 $ 54,1 $ 111,6 $
$ (0,9) $ 50,1 $ 80,4
$ (14,8) $ 59,9 $ 42,5
782,7 $
810,7 $
813,4 $
821,2 $
763,8 $
731,2 $
109,2 $ 179,1 $ 494,4 $
115,0 $ 194,7 $ 501,0 $
115,6 $ 204,0 $ 493,9 $
116,1 $ 215,3 $ 489,8 $
106,7 $ 214,1 $ 443,0 $
99,8 $ 231,7 $ 399,6 $
AKTENTASCHEN | HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL
Dieses Dokument ist nur zur Verwendung durch Wenrui Pei in MGT 300 Winter 2017 autorisiert, das von Jaclyn Jensen, DePaul University, von Januar 2017 bis März 2017 unterrichtet wird.
Zur ausschließlichen Verwendung durch W. Pei, 2017. Clayton Industries: Peter Arnell, Country Manager für Italien | 4199
Ausstellung 4
Branchenumsatz von Luftbehandlungsprodukten (einschließlich Kältemaschinen) 2003–2008
Millionen USD (außer wo angegeben)
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Einheiten (‘000) Vereinigte Staaten
61.263,4
64.104.4
67.137.1
70.380,4
71.142,0
4,6 %
4,7 %
4,8 %
1,1 %
0,4 %
15.315,9
16.667,1
18.127,0
19.706,5
20.986,9
22.137.2
8,8 %
8,8 %
8,7 %
6,5 %
5,5 %
2.718,9
2,832.2
2,940.5
3,074.6
3,273.6
3,482.5
4.2%
3.8%
4.6%
6.5%
6.4%
6,012.4
6,386.9
6,862.9
6,886.9
6,921.7
3.8%
6,2 %
7.5%
0.3%
0.5%
2,386.8
2,519.8
2,683.3
3,502.2
4,274.1
% Change
Europe % Change
Italy % Change
Millions of USD – current prices United States
5,794.7
% Change
Europea
1,997.4
% Change
Italya
755.7
% Change
Millions of USD – constant prices United States
5,794.7
% Change
Europea
1,945.4
% Change
Italya
736.1
% Change
71,410.2
19.5%
5.6%
6.5%
30.5%
22.0%
861.0
887.8
934.5
1,149.3
1,336.4
13.9%
3.1%
5.3%
23.0%
16.3%
5,855.6
6,016.2
6,262.6
6,107.3
5,959.4
1,1 %
2,7 %
4.1%
(2.5%)
(2.4%)
2,335.5
2,499.8
2,691.4
3,540.2
N / A
20.0%
7.0%
7.7%
31.5%
820.5
829.7
855.3
1,030.2
11.5%
1,1 %
3.1%
20.5%
0.8051
0.8045
0.7970
0.7308
N / A
a Converted annually at following exchange rates:
EUR / US$
0.8854
0.6834
Source: Euromonitor International and casewriter estimates.
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL | BRIEFCASES
11
This document is authorized for use only by Wenrui Pei in MGT 300 Winter 2017 taught by Jaclyn Jensen, DePaul University from January 2017 to March 2017.
For the exclusive use of W. Pei, 2017. 4199 | Clayton Industries: Peter Arnell, Country Manager for Italy
Exhibit 5
Forecast Sales of Air Treatment Products (including Chillers), 2009–2013
Millions of USD (except where indicated)
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Units (‘000) United States
72,391.6
73,911.5
75,532.5
77,253.8
1,4 %
2.1%
2,2 %
2.3%
2.4%
22,441.4
23,651.7
24,925.7
26,266.3
27,695.5
5.4%
5.4%
5.4%
5.4%
3,692.2
3,910.4
4,128.6
4,347.9
N / A
6.0%
5,9 %
5.6%
5.3%
7,013.6
7,139.2
7,287.8
7,462.0
7,632.0
1.3%
1.8%
2.1%
2.4%
2.3%
4,249.4
4,687.6
5,106.9
5,486.5
N / A
10,3 %
8.9%
7.4%
1,328.1
1,414.9
1,493.2
1,558.7
(0.6%)
6.5%
5.5%
4.4%
0.7389
0.7389
0.7389
0.7389
% Change
Europe % Change
Italy % Change
Millions of USD – current prices United States % Change
Europea
% Change
Italya
% Change
79,130.0
N / A
aConverted annually at following exchange rates:
EUR / US$
0.7389
Source: Euromonitor International and casewriter estimates.
Exhibit 6
Brescia Plant Economics
Millions of USD (except where indicated) Units Revenue
Italya Contribution to Clayton SpA
Othera Total
Operating Expense Direct materials Labor Overhead – Fixed Total EBITDA EBITDA Margin
Capital Expenditures Capex Margin
2004 348.0
2005 372.0
2006 382.0
2007 386.0
2008 375.0
1H09 155.0
67.1
73.2
76.7
79.0
76.0
29.9
53.7%
55.3%
55.6%
55.7%
56.6%
55.2%
10.9 75.2
11.3 82.4
11.1 86.7
11.3 89.6
11.5 86.7
4.1 34.0
19.7 16.1 29.0 64.8
23.7 16.6 31.3 71.5
29.2 16.9 32.2 78.3
37.5 15.3 34.9 87.6
50.1 15.7 33.6 99.4
18.5 7.2 15.7 41.3
10.4
10.9
8.4
2.0
(12.8)
(7.3)
13.8%
13.2%
9.7%
2.3%
(14.7%)
(21.5%)
10.8
11.2
2.3
2.8
3.0
0.8
14.4%
13.6%
2,7 %
3.1%
3.5%
2.3%
190
196
204
208
204
203
0.8051
0.8045
0.7970
0.7308
0.6834
0.7389
Headcount aConverted annually at following exchange rates:
EUR / US$
12
BRIEFCASES | HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL
This document is authorized for use only by Wenrui Pei in MGT 300 Winter 2017 taught by Jaclyn Jensen, DePaul University from January 2017 to March 2017.
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